In English

GPS spoofing at sea

Nicklas Lindroth ; Albert Falk
Göteborg : Chalmers tekniska högskola, 2018. 48 s.
[Examensarbete på grundnivå]

The Global Positioning System (GPS) has been a central part of navigational equipment on ship bridges for decades. Navigational equipment is being integrated more in to a bridge system working in synergy, but the Officer Of the Watch (OOW) may not have the knowledge and training to deal with all the aspects of the rapid advance of technology.

To determine whether GPS spoofing is a potential risk, a structured interview was held with navigational officers on Swedish passenger ferries sailing in the Baltic Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat. The interview was focused on key factors in the daily practice of the OOW to answer the questions of this study.

Tendencies towards over reliance on navigational equipment was found in the data presented. For example, if a Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) echo of a buoy and its position in the electronic chart would differ, the OOW would presume it most likely that the buoy is drifting. That the GPS has an offset or that any other navigational equipment is presenting false information was not regarded as likely by the interviewees.

Having land objects within RADAR range would be a solution to notice a difference between the electronic chart and RADAR echoes of land objects. Answers in the structured interview show that small RADAR scales often are used, especially in bad weather conditions. Therefore, noticing a spoofing attempt in certain scenarios seems slight.

Nyckelord: GPS, manipulation, spoofing, OOW, Swedish passenger ferries, RADAR scale, chart overlay, ECDIS.

Publikationen registrerades 2018-11-09. Den ändrades senast 2018-11-09

CPL ID: 256274

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